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1. Introduction
Models with a large number of ex-ante identical agents with standard preferences
subject to uninsurable, idiosyncratic shocks to income are the main tool used to
answer two questions that many economists see as important: (1) what is the size of
precautionary savings (savings held for the sole purpose of smoothing consumption
across different contingencies)?, and (2) what accounts for the very large differences
in assets holdings among American households? The accepted answ er to the first
question as posed, for example, by Aiyagari (1994) is that precautionary savings are
small, no more than 3% of total savings. With respect to the second question, there
is a debate about the extent to which a theory of wealth inequality can be based on
standard and identical preferences and on uninsurable shocks to income.1
In this paper we study, in the context described in the previous paragraph, the role
played by habit formation in determining the volume of precautionary savings and in
shaping the distribution of wealth, and hence, the answers to those two important
questions.
Habit formation has been recently used to improve the predictions of time-
separable models in different fields where savings behavior under uncertainty and the
income-fluctuation problem are the chief ingredients. For instance, some authors
have pursued this path and studied various formulations of habit formation to
improve our understanding of the equity premium puzzle.2 Other authors have 
used this class of preferences to study the observed relationship betw een savings
and grow th.3 Finally, Fuhrer (2000) show s how the presence of habits in 
consumption can generate slow and hump-shaped reactions of consumption to
monetary and other shocks. Despite all this work with habits,4 its implications for
1For example Krusell and Smith (1998) postulate shocks to preferences to account for wealth inequality
w hile Carroll (2000) argues that w e should use models where consumers consider the accumulation of
wealth as an end in itself or models where wealth yields a large unobservable flow of services. Quadrini and 
Rı!os-Rull (1997) contains a reviewof the literature and its successes and failures in accounting for w ealth 
inequality with uninsurable shocks to income. On the other hand, recently Castan˜ eda et al. (2001), argues 
that a suitably modified version of the basic model with identical and standard preferences and uninsurable 
shocks does account for the wealth inequality observed in the U.S. An important modification proposed by 
these authors is the use of a process for earnings with more volatility than those found in previous work.
2
Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) show that adding habit formation to an otherw ise 
standard exchange model economy, the equity premium puzzle as stated by Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
disappears. The same result is obtained by Heaton (1995), Boldrin et al. (1997, 2001) and Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999).
3The evidence show s that, across countries and across households, the grow th rate of income has a 
positive and significant effect on the savings rate (see Edwards (1995), Carroll and Weil (1994), Deaton and 
Paxson (1994), for instance). To account for this observed pattern Carroll et al. (2000) modify the standard 
Ak model to display habit formation. They show that the model is successful to replicate the positive
response of the savings rate to the growth rate of income.
4
In this work, as in ours, households do not value leisure. The role of time non-separabilities in leisure is 
dormant since its early appearance in quantitative theory in Kydland and Prescott (1982). Also we do not 
look at the feature opposite to habit formation, that is durability of consumption, even though in the 
context of our model preferences could display durability of consumption by simply setting one parameter 
to a negative value. The reason is that the definition of wealth that we use already includes a large fraction 
of the stock of consumer durables.
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the determination of precautionary savings and for shaping the wealth distribution
have not been explored. This is precisely the target of this paper.
There are reasons to think that the habit formation hypothesis may have a
significant role in shaping the wealth distribution and in determining the size of
precautionary savings. Households with habits want, not only a smooth pattern of
consumption, but also a smooth pattern of changes in consumption. This implies
that households in habits economies dislike consumption fluctuations to a larger
extent than their counterparts in a world of time-separable preferences. This should
increase the amount of precautionary savings. How much it will is one of the
quantitative questions we address. Any effect on wealth concentration relies on an
asymmetric impact, over different types of agents, of the habit formation hypothesis
on the disutility of consumption fluctuations. On the one hand, when bad times
strike, households will deplete their assets faster to ensure a mild decrease in
consumption. But on the other hand, anticipating this problem, they will have
accumulated some extra assets. In equilibrium, which force will dominate for each
type of agent? This is the key for the second quantitative question addressed in the
paper.
There is a variety of attempts trying to quantify the size of precautionary savings. 
The econometric literature offers diverse answers that range from being very small 
Dynan (1993) to the quite large Carroll and Samwick (1998).5,6 Within the 
macroeconomic literature, there are some attempts to measure the importance of 
precautionary savings using models with a large number of ex-ante identical agents 
subject to uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk. Within a partial equilibrium context 
Hubbard et al. (1994) find that idiosyncratic uncertainty implies an increase in the 
aggregate capital-income ratio of 0.90 percent, while  Carroll and Samw ick (1997) 
find that households facing higher uncertainty accumulate more w ealth although such 
response is much low er than the one predicted in Hubbard et al. (1994).7 Finally, 
Cagetti (2000) finds that for individuals under 50 years old almost all savings respond 
to precautionary motives and that at the age of retirement wealth is tw ice as high as in 
a world without diosyncratic uncertainty. How ever, in general equilibrium models the 
size of precautionary savings is substantially reduced, the reason being that, as 
aggregate savings increase, their return fall. Aiyagari (1994) in a infinite horizon 
economy finds that precautionary savings are small, no more than 3 percent of total 
savings. Huggett (1996) finds similar result in a life-cycle economy.
Thus, the accepted answer, at least within the context of general equilibrium
models, seems to be that precautionary savings are small. As stated before, habit
5They estimate that between 39 and 46 percent of wealth of individuals under 50 years is attributable to
the extra uncertainty that some consumers face compared to the lowest uncertainty group.
6See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a survey of the empirical literature on precautionary savings.
7 In particular, Carroll and Samw ick (1997) show that to obtain a level of responsiveness of w ealth 
similar to Hubbard et al. (1994) estimates, the rate of time preference should be as high as 11 percent, as 
opposed to Hubbard et al. (1994) who use a rate of 3 percent.
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formation provides an extra reason for further expanding the precautionary motive
in spite of the fall in the return on savings.8
To study the role of habits we compare a standard economy without habits (the
benchmark economy) with various habits counterparts. We proceed by first looking
at economies with the same parameterization except for the habits. The two
economies do not have the same intertemporal elasticity of substitution (henceforth
IES). Hence, households in the habits and in the benchmark economy not only differ
in their attitude towards risk, but also in their willingness to intertemporally
substitute consumption. To better understand the implications of habits, we
compare the benchmark economy with the habits economies recalibrated to have
the same IES. To further study the role of habits in shaping wealth inequality we
want to isolate the effect of habits on risk aversion from the induced effects brought
by the changes in the interest rate that go together with the associated changes in risk
aversion. To this end, we compare the benchmark economy with the habits
economies calibrated to have not only the same IES, but also the same aggregate
savings. To analyze the effect of the persistence of habits on the level of
precautionary savings and wealth inequality we study two habits economies: one
in which habits respond very quickly to changes in consumption (non-persistent) and
other in which the response of habits is very slow (persistent).
We find that the presence of habits generates a volume of precautionary savings
whose size goes from two to three times the volume of precautionary savings
generated by the standard model, depending on the habits persistence. With respect
to inequality we find that habits do decrease wealth inequality as measured by the
coefficient of variation and the Gini Index by about 10 and 18 percent also
depending on habits persistence (for instance, the Gini Index is 0.404 in the
benchmark model without habits and it goes down to 0.339 in one of the habits
economies). The reason for this decrease in wealth inequality is the different effect
that habits has on households depending on their level of wealth: wealth poor
households increase their precautionary savings more than wealth rich ones do.
There are two reasons for this: first, other things equal, wealth rich households have
a smaller proportion of their income in form of risky labor earnings, and, second,
wealth rich households have higher buffer stocks to smooth out consumption
fluctuations (as a matter of fact, even without habit formation they are already very
well self-insured, so there is no big need for extra cover in face of the higher disutility
of consumption fluctuations).
These results, as we have stated, depend on the persistence of the habits process.
When the habit stock is not persistent (as when instance habits depend only on the
consumption of the previous period) the effect on households’ behavior is much
weaker than when the habit stock is persistent (as when it is given by the whole
history of past consumption). The reason for this is that households care about
fluctuations of consumption around their habit stock. Given a change in
8However, we should note that these findings are made in an economy with very little wealth disparity
which implies that there are very few agents close to the assets positions that leave them vulnerable to
adverse shocks.
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consumption, when the habit process is (not) persistent, it takes many (few) periods
to catch up with the consumption level and therefore variations of consumption over
the habit stock are big (small) as it is the utility loss.
These findings, although quantitatively smaller, also hold in model economies that
generate Gini coefficients closer to those in the data.9 In this case precautionary
savings are between 1.5 and 2.7 its size in the non-habits economy (where they are
quite large) and the reduction in the inequality measures ranges between 3 and 8
percent. The larger changes correspond to economies with persistent habits. Thus,
our assessment is that while the effect of habits in precautionary savings can be very
big, the overall effect in wealth inequality is milder.
In this paper the vector of state variables includes both habits and assets, two
variables directly controlled by the household. This feature complicates the
numerical methods involved which leads us to use multidimensional splines to solve
the problem of the household. We consider of independent value the procedures that
we use to compute equilibria and we describe them in more than the usual detail.
Section 2 describes the model, while Section 3 describes the calibration process.
Section 4, describes the findings, while Section 5 explores the robustness of the
findings with respect to the process for earnings. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A
describes how we solved the problem of the agent and how we computed equilibria,
while Appendix B describes how the IES is calculated in different economies and
Appendix C describes the values of two measures of risk aversion for habits
economies.
2. The model economy
The economy is a growth economy with production populated by a measure one
of households that live forever. We only look at steady states. Section 2.1 describes
preferences with habits. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 describe the technology, including
the production sector, the shock process that affect households and the
market arrangements. In Section 2.4 we write down the households problem while
Section 2.5 presents a formal definition of steady state equilibrium.
2.1. Preferences
Households derive utility from current and past consumption. Current consump-
tion is denoted by c: Past consumption affects the level of a stock of habits that we
denote with hA½0;NÞ: We write the evolution of habits as h0 ¼ cðc; hÞ; where we
already use the recursive notation that is pervasive throughout the paper with primes
denoting next period’s values. We write the per period utility as uðc; hÞ; and total
utility as
PN
t¼0 b
tuðct; htÞ: Notice that, since current consumption affects future per
9We get this large wealth differences by calibrating the process for labor earnings as proposed by
Castañeda et al. (2001).
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period utilities (by means of ht), preferences over consumption are not time-
separable.
The term habits refers to preferences where an increase in h lowers the utility
derived from a given level of consumption: @uðc; hÞ=@ho0: When this is positive the
term used is durability, and it has very different considerations.
2.2. Technology
Each period households receive a shock to their efficiency units of labor
eAE ¼ fe1;y; eneg: This shock is Markov with transition matrix, pe;e0 :
Aggregate output, Y ; is produced according to an aggregate neoclassical
production function that takes as inputs capital, K ; and efficient units of labor, L;
Y ¼ F ðK ;LÞ: The aggregate labor input comes from aggregating all agents’
efficiency units of labor. Aggregate capital results from aggregation of all assets.
Capital depreciates at rate dA½0; 1:
2.3. Market arrangements
There are no state contingent markets for the household specific shock, e:
Households hold assets aAA 	 ½
%
a;NÞ that pay interest at rate r: We assume that
households are restricted by a lower bound on their assets holdings
%
a: This lower
bound may arise endogenously as the quantity that ensures that the household is
capable of repaying its debt in all states of the world or we can just set it exogenously
as a borrowing constraint.10 The absence of state-contingent markets and the
presence of borrowing constraints are the ingredients needed to depart from
the representative agent framework which is silent about distributional issues in the
cross-section.11
2.4. The household’s problem
Since we only look at steady states, the individual household’s state variables are
its shock, its assets and its stock of habit, fe; a; hg: The problem that the household
solves is
vðe; a; hÞ ¼ max
cX0;a0X
%
a
uðc; hÞ þ b
X
e0
pe;e0vðe0; a0; h0Þ ð1Þ
s:t: : a0 ¼ ew þ ð1þ rÞa  c; ð2Þ
h0 ¼ cðc; hÞ; ð3Þ
where r and w are the return on assets and the rental rate for efficiency units of labor.
10See Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) for details. Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) contains a review
on this topic.
11See Chatterjee (1994) or Alvarez and Dı!az (2000).
6
It is well known that under certain conditions problems of this type have a
solution that we denote a0 ¼ gaðe; a; hÞ; c ¼ gcðe; a; hÞ with an upper bound on asset
holdings, %a and on the stock of habits %h; such that %aXgaðe; a; hÞX
%
a and %h >
cðgcðe; a; hÞ; hÞ > 0; for all eAE; all hAfh j 0php %hg; and all aAfa j
%
apap %ag:
Sometimes we use the compact notation s ¼ fe; a; hg and S ¼ fE  ½
%
a; %a  ½0; %hg:
With respect to assets, the required conditions amount to have a low enough rate of
return, bo1=ð1þ rÞ: Again, see Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1993), or Quadrini and
R!ıos-Rull (1997) for details. With respect to habits, it suffices to have a bounded c:
It is possible to construct a Markov process for the individual state variables, from 
the Markov process on the shocks and from the decision rules of the agents (see 
Huggett (1993) or Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) for details). Let B be the s-algebra 
generated in S by, say, the open intervals. A probability measure x over B 
exhaustively describes the economy by stating howmany households are of each 
type. Note that the first moment of x over e yields the aggregate labor input while the 
first moment over a yields aggregate capital.
Let Qðs; BÞ denote the probability that a type fsg has of becoming of a type in
BCB: Function Q naturally describes how the economy moves over time by
generating a probability measure for tomorrow x0 given a probability measure x
today. The exact way in which this occurs is
x0ðBÞ ¼
Z
S
Qðs; BÞ dx: ð4Þ
If the process for the earnings shock is nice in the sense that it has a unique
stationary distribution, then so has the economy.12 Furthermore, this unique
stationary distribution is the limit to which the economy converges under any initial
distribution.13
2.5. Equilibrium
We have almost all the ingredients to define a steady state equilibrium. We only
need to add the condition that marginal productivities yield factor prices as functions
of x: Note that to obtain a steady state, we look for a measure of households x such
that given the prices implied by that measure, households actions reproduce next
period the same measure x: Formally, a steady state equilibrium for this economy is
a set of functions for the household problem fv; ga; gcg; and a measure of households,
x; such that: (i), Factor inputs are obtained aggregating over households:
A ¼
R
S
a dx; and L ¼
R
S
e dx; (ii), factor prices are factor marginal productivities,
r ¼ F1ðK ; LÞ  d; and w ¼ F2ðK ;LÞ; (iii), given x; K ; and L; the functions fv; ga; gcg
solve the households’ decision problem described in Section 2.4; (iv), the goods
12For example if it satisfies the American-dream American-nightmare condition stated in Ríos-Rull
(1998), then there is a unique stationary distribution of households over earning shocks, assets holdings 
and stock of habits.
13This does not mean that this will happen in equilibrium outside the steady state. The transition Q has
been constructed under the assumption that the households think that prices are constant.
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market clears:
R
S
½gcðsÞ þ gaðsÞ dx ¼ F ðK ; LÞ þ ð1 dÞK ; and (v), the measure of
households is stationary: xðBÞ ¼
R
S
Qðs;BÞ dx; for all BCB:
3. Calibration
This paper explores the role of habits in quantitatively shaping the size of 
precautionary savings and the w ealth distribution. To do this, w e compare 
economies identical in every respect but the specification of preferences: while in a 
benchmark economy preferences display no habit formation, in the other economies 
preferences display habits. We start by choosing the benchmark model economy 
to be essentially a version of Aiyagari (1994) that has become the standard in 
the literature that measures the size of precautionary savings. We describe the 
calibration of the benchmark model economy in Section 3.1 and that of the model 
economies with habits in Section 3.2.
Once we have a benchmark model economy without habits we have to calibrate
the economies with habits. There is not a unique way to do this, since habits have
been modelled in at least two ways. On the one side, there is a survival consumption
branch. Past consumption piles up into a habit stock that determines a minimal
consumption for today, below which utility is not defined.14 On the other side, there
is a multiplicative habit branch. Past consumption piles up into a habit stock that
enters utility dividing today’s consumption, capturing the notion that, under habit
formation, it is not consumption level but relative consumption what matters.15
Therefore, the two different approaches differ in two dimensions. First, the survival
consumption household cares about the absolute difference between consumption
and habit stock whereas the multiplicative habit consumer cares about the relative
difference. And second, for the survival consumption household, consuming below
the minimal level given by the habit stock is not defined (death) whereas it is well
defined for the multiplicative habit consumer.
Regarding the first difference, the survival consumption representation has been 
preferred by authors working with the representative agent hypothesis in the field of 
asset pricing. As Campbell and Cochrane (1999) claim, one needs this formulation to 
get the equity premium negatively correlated with the cycle.16 However, Krusell and 
Smith (1997) show that once we allow for heterogeneous agents an economy with no 
habits can deliver a negative correlation between the equity premium and the cycle. 
Furthermore, Pijoan-Mas (2003) shows that this last result is preserved when adding 
a multiplicative habit in the heterogeneous agents economy.
Regarding the second difference, it is difficult to reconcile the survival habit
approach with individual data. Even in the most conservative earnings process, any
14Pioneered by Ryder and Heal (1973) and follow ed for instance by Constantinides (1990), Heaton
(1995), Boldrin et al. (1997) or Dynan (2000).
15Used for instance by Abel (1990), Carroll et al. (2000) or Fuhrer (2000).
16Campbell and Cochrane (1999) put it this w ay: ‘‘As consumption declines tow ard the habit in a 
business cycle through, the curvature of the utility function rises’’. In particular, the Arrow–Pratt measure 
of risk aversion rises as consumption falls toward the habit.
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household can see its labor earnings halved between two consecutive periods. If one
wants to replicate the U.S. data Gini coefficient for earnings, being unlucky may
mean dividing earnings by a factor of 9 (see Section 5) in one period or even by 45 in
two periods (in an extreme bad luck case). The survival habit utility function can
hardly accommodate this variation in earnings if households do not accumulate huge
precautionary savings. In contrast, variations in earnings in aggregate data are not
so sharp and fit well in the survival consumption utility function.
We choose to work with the multiplicative habit utility function. The reason is
twofold. First, the motives that brought the survival consumption representation into
the picture are absent here. Namely, to have a representative agent economy display
certain properties of data that an heterogeneous agents economy already does with
the multiplicative habit. And second, since we calibrate and simulate our model
economies to represent individual behavior, the computational problem associated
to solving the model when consumption falls below habit in the survival consumption
case becomes very big. However, in Section 4.5 we also provide some simulations
for the survival consumption utility function to show that the qualitative results are
the same.
We choose to study two types of habits that differ in their persistence. Essentially
persistent habits imply that current consumption enters negatively the per period
utility function of all future periods, albeit in a decreasing manner. Non-persistent
habits are those where the influence of current consumption ends next period since the
per period utility function only depends on yesterday’s and on today’s consumption.
We have to choose not only the type of habits, but we also have to be very specific
with respect to what is the habits counterpart to our benchmark model economy. We
propose a sequence of economies in increasing order of appropriateness. First,
we think of the habits economy as an economy like the benchmark with the addition
of the term in habits but keeping constant all other parameters.
Habit formation breaks the link between risk aversion and the IES. Thus,
economies that keep their parameterization identical to that of the benchmark model
economy except for the specification of habits differ in the IES. For this reason we
also compare the benchmark economy with another model economy with habits but
adjusted so that it has the same IES. This is achieved by changing one parameter of
preferences.
We explore the role of habits in shaping the distribution of wealth. Part of our
interest is in the size of precautionary savings, but another important part of our
concerns is inequality. We want to separate the effects of habits on both
characteristics and for this reason we also investigate an economy that has not
only the same IES as the benchmark model economy, but also the same of total
savings.
3.1. The benchmark model economy (no habits)
In the benchmark model economy, preferences are of the CRRA form,P
t b
tðc1st  1Þ=ð1 sÞ and we set a period to be one year. Parameter b is set at
0:96; which places the equilibrium interest rate around 4%. We set the IES, 1=s to be
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equal to 0.5, a value that is around those most preferred by economists. This is our 
only departure from Aiyagari (1994) in the benchmark model economy since for all 
other choices w e mimic his values.17 Production occurs through a standard
neoclassical production function F ðKt;LtÞ ¼ Kyt L
1y
t : Capital share is equal to 0.36
and the depreciation rate of capital d is set equal to 0.08. Note that these are all
standard values.
With respect to the process for earnings, Aiyagari (1994) sets an AR(1) in the
logarithm of labor income. The process is fully described by two parameters: its
persistence and its volatility. He chooses both values following estimates of
Kydland (1984) that used PSID data and of Abowd and Card (1987) and Abowd
and Card (1989) that used both PSID and NLS data. Then, he approximates the 
process by using a seven state Markov chain following the procedures described in
Tauchen (1986). We follow the same directions although w e reduce the Markov
chain to three states.18 We take our benchmark to be an autocorrelation of 0.6 and a
coefficient of variation of 0.2.19 We later provide results for an economy that has a
lot more earnings dispersion, an economy capable of generating wealth dispersion
more in accordance with the data.20 The specific parameter values that we choose are 
summarized in Table 1.
3.2. Calibration of the economies with habits
As we have already stated, we use the specification of preferences used by Carroll et 
al. (2000) and Fuhrer (2000) based on that of Abel (1990) where the stock of habits h 
enters multiplying the level of consumption. The per period utility function is
uðc; hÞ ¼
ðchgÞ1s  1
1 s
¼
½c1gðc=hÞg1s  1
1 s
; 1 > g > 0: ð5Þ
The second way of writing the specification highlights the fact that consumers care
about a composite good which is a weighted average of the absolute value of
consumption (being rich or being poor) and the relative level of consumption with
respect to the past (being better or worse than usual). For g ¼ 0 we are in the
17Aiyagari (1994) uses values of 1, 0.33 and, 0.2. Ghez and Becker (1975) and MaCurdy (1981), both
using a life cycle model and explicitly accounting for leisure postulate a lowvalue. Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) and Prescott (1986) discuss other estimates in the literature and conclude that a reasonable number 
is not too far from 1 (notice that the models they use have quarters as periods). Cooley and Prescott (1995) 
point out that this parameter is among the most difficult to pin down and settle for a value of 1. Hurd 
(1989) has a point estimate below one.
18As we describe below, habits introduce an additional choice state variable which dramatically
increases the computational costs of the project. By choosing three states we reduce computer time
drastically in a margin that has never proved to be important.
19Aiyagari (1994) provides results for autocorrelations of 0.0, 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9 and for coefficient of 
variations of 0.2 and 0.4.
20Aiyagari (1994) fails to account for the amount of wealth inequality in the U.S. The highest value of 
the coefficient of variation of assets in any of his model economies is 1.13 compared to 6.09 in the data. As 
Castañeda et al. (2001) points out, this is in part due to the process of earnings that he chooses. According 
to Díaz-Gimenez et al. (1997) the coefficient of variation for U.S. earnings from the 1992 Survey of 
Consumer Finances is as big as 4.19 whereas the largest value Aiyagari uses is 0.4.
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no-habits case: only absolute consumption matters. For g ¼ 1 we are in the opposite
case: only relative consumption matters. Notice, hence, that the same reason that
makes households willing to smooth consumption levels is going to make them
willing to smooth the ratio of consumption over the habit stock (so they are better
off with several small changes than with a single big change).
The evolution of the stock of habits is given by the function
h0 ¼ cðc; hÞ ¼ ð1 lÞh þ lc; lAð0; 1: ð6Þ
Thus, the level of habit is a weighted average of the stream of past consumption. The
parameter ð1 lÞmeasures the persistence of the habit stock. The higher the value of
l the lower the duration of the influence of current consumption in future per period
utilities.21 As l decreases the effect of c in future utilities increases and the ability of
current consumption to modify the habit stock is reduced.22
Calibrating the basic habits model economy requires choosing values for the
parameters l and g: Notice that the benchmark model economy has a representation
under this parameterization: the value of g is zero (which makes irrelevant the
value of l).
There are several studies that try to estimate the parameters of habit formation in
consumption. Some use individual level short panels, whereas some others use
aggregate time series. Some try to find out which parameterizations are consistent
Table 1
Parameter values of the benchmark model economy
General parameters
b s y d
0.96 2 0.36 0.08
Earnings process
eAe1; e2; e3 ¼ 0:78; 1:00; 1:27
pe;e0 ¼
0:66
0:28
0:07
2
4 0:270:44
0:27
0:07
0:28
0:66
3
5
Stationary distribution
p% ¼ 0.337 0.326 0.337
21Notice that for l ¼ 1 we are in the particular case that today’s habit stock is only yesterday’s
consumption or, in other words, today’s consumption only affects tomorrow’s utility.
22Notice also that setting l ¼ 0 is not equal to the limit case of l-0: One can rewrite the law of motion
for habits as *h0 ¼ ð1 lÞ *h þ c where *h 	 h=l because l is just a constant that does not affect the
maximization. Under this representation we see that the role of l is solely to control the persistence of the
process and does not affect the strength of consumption in the habit stock. However, we cannot do this
normalization when l ¼ 0 because it would imply dividing the utility function by zero, which does affect
the maximization. Therefore, in this particular case l is doing two things, namely, setting the persistence of
habits equal to one and saying that consumption does not affect the habit stock.
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with certain asset pricing regularities whereas some others try to estimate
consumption demand functions or first order conditions.23 The heterogeneity of
data sets and techniques rises to a very wide range of possible values for our g and l:
Ideally, we would be looking for estimations consistent with our model in functional
forms and length of period. Unfortunately, this is hard to find.
The closest model to ours is the one by Fuhrer (2000) who uses quarterly data on 
aggregate consumption data in non-durable goods and services (from NIPA) to 
estimate a log-linearized consumption function where habits enter multiplicatively in 
the utility function as in our model. He estimates g ¼ 0:8 and l ¼ 0:9985: An 
estimation of s ¼ 6:11 is consistent with the IES ¼ 0:5 we use throughout the paper.24
Constantinides (1990) and Boldrin et al. (1997) try to find w hich pairs of 
parameters are consistent w ith the observed risk premium and w ith both the 
observed risk premium and risk free rate respectively. However, they use the survival 
consumption formulation to introduce habits in the utility function. Boldrin et al.
(1997) find the best fit with the equivalent to our notation of g ¼ 0:58 and l ¼ 0:70:25 
Constantinides finds several pairs that fit the risk premium, with weight of habit g 
ranging from 0.09 to 0.49 and corresponding persistence parameter l ranging from 
0.10 to 0.37.26 Although these papers solve the equity premium puzzle as stated by 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) they still have some counterfactual implications as the 
excessive unconditional variance of the risk free rate. Heaton (1995) performs a 
similar experiment with monthly aggregate time series in non-durable consumption 
and services by NIPA getting g ¼ 0:71 and l ¼ 0:58: However, he also sets a more 
ambitious framework allow ing for habit formation and consumption durability to 
interact (and not to offset each other as in Ferson and Constantinides (1991)) and 
targeting not only first moments of asset returns but also second moments. With this 
larger moments set he finds g ¼ 0:00 and l ¼ 1:0 if a pure habit model is used (which 
is evidence against habits) but g ¼ 0:67 and l ¼ 0:18 if interaction with durability is 
allow ed for. In this last case we see a very high persistence (in monthly data) not 
found in other studies.27
23There are some others that just test for the presence of habit formation without estimating any closed
form. A good example of these is Meghir and Weber (1996).
24Fuhrer (2000) also allows for a fraction of agents not to behave rationally but just to eat all their 
current income. He estimates this fraction to be 25% of the total population.
25This is an abuse of notation because their formulation is different from ours. We can somehow
‘‘translate’’ parameters from one to the other seeing the survival consumption representation as uðct; htÞ ¼
ðct  htÞ
1s=ð1 sÞ and htþ1 ¼ ð1 lÞht þ gct:
26Constantinides (1990) represents uðct; htÞ ¼ ðct  htÞ
1s=ð1 sÞ: The discrete time version of the law
of motion for the stock of habits he uses is ht ¼ ð1=ð1þ aÞÞ
th0 þ b
Pt
i¼1 ð1=ð1þ aÞÞ
i1cti : Thus, we
translate l ¼ 1 1=ð1þ aÞ and g ¼ b:
27Two other important papers in the asset pricing literature w ith habit formation are Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999) and Boldrin et al. (2001). However, they do not seem to us such a useful reference for 
calibrating our habit process. The former paper sets up an external process for the habit stock, that is to 
say, the habit stock does not depend on individual consumption but on aggregate consumption instead, 
something that is also known as keeping up with the Jones. In the steady state of our economies aggregate 
variables are constant and therefore an external habit stock would also be a constant. The latter paper is 
an effort to put together asset pricing and business cycles in a model with many ingredients beyond habit 
formation.
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Dynan (2000) also uses the survival consumption formulation with individual level 
data on food consumption from PSID. Because of data restrictions she imposes 
l ¼ 1:0 (i.e., only yesterday consumption matters) to find that g cannot be said to be 
different from zero.28,29
We find Fuhrer estimation as the closest one to our formulation. Since he uses 
quarterly data and we are calibrating for a model period of one-year length we see 
his g ¼ 0:8 as an upper bound and end up choosing g ¼ 0:75: As for the persistence 
parameter, we work with a pair of values at each side of the possible range: l ¼ 1:0 
and l ¼ 0:25: The former is consistent w ith Fuhrer estimation whereas the latter, 
acknowledging the diversity of empirical results, will show us what happens at the 
other side of the persistence range.30,31 Our choices are described in Table 2.
3.3. The value of the IES
With CRRA preferences and no habit formation, preferences over different 
periods in time and over different contingencies are the same. Adding time non-
separable preferences breaks this symmetry. As shown by Constantinides (1990) and 
Boldrin et al. (1997), habit formation breaks the link between the IES and the level of 
risk aversion. In order to disentangle the effect of habit formation in each dimension 
w e look at model economies w ith habit formation exhibiting the same IES as our 
benchmark so that the results show the effect of habits on preferences over uncertain 
levels of consumption, not over intertemporally distributed consumption. In 
Appendix B w e show that, along a balanced growth path, IES ¼ 1=ðg þ ð 1  gÞsÞ:32 
This tells us two things. First, if individuals are not
Table 2
Basic parameters of the habits economies
g l
Low persistence economy 0.75 1.00
High persistence economy 0.75 0.25
Benchmark model economy 0.00 —
28She has the same problem as Meghir and Weber (1996). Time dimension in individual level data is
very short and does not allow for estimations of persistent habits.
29She uses the survival consumption formulation with individual data. This also helps finding g not
different from zero since it is very difficult to accommodate the large individual variability of consumption
with the endogenous survival consumption level unless g is very small.
30We have obviously tried different values of g: In none of our experiments g has changed the qualitative
results. g behaves just as an amplifier of the habit phenomenon.
31 We find interesting to explore a low lambda in spite of Fuhrer’s findings because of the following. 
Meghir and Weber (1996) and Dynan (2000) reject the hypothesis of habit formation using individual level 
data. How ever, the lack of long time series forces them to equalize habit stock to previous period 
consumption. If habits are very persistent, as Heaton (1995) suggests, it might well be the case that their 
rejection of the habit hypothesis is driven by the fact that, under very persistent habits, yesterday’s 
consumption ability to modify the habit stock is small.
32Carroll et al. (2000) already showthis result in a continuous time Ak growth model.
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financially constrained, preferences towards consumption in different moments of time
do not depend on the persistence of the habit stock, ð1 lÞ; but only on the magnitude
of habits in the utility function, g: Second, with habit formation preferences towards
consumption in different moments of time exhibit less curvature than without habit
formation (in other words, households desire less consumption smoothing).33 The
reason for this being, as posed by Carroll et al. (2000), that ‘‘the gain or loss in utility
associated with a given increase or decrease in consumption over a long horizon will be
diminished by the associated movement in the habit stock’’. Therefore, when we want
to keep IES as in the benchmark economy given g; we will adjust s:
4. Results
In this section we report the findings from the various model economies. The
results have been computed by solving the household’s problem with a two-
dimensional spline tensor product (that we ensure generates a concave function). We
construct a sample of 5000 households.34 Then, using the decision rule, the law of
motion for the exogenous state and a random number generator, we simulate the
decisions of these households to find a new distribution of households. We iterate
until the main statistics of the samples converge. Then, we compare the statistics
generated for all the economies studied by using in all of them the same realizations
of the random numbers.35
In Section 4.1 we review the Aiyagari (1994)’s model economy, which we will refer 
to as the benchmark economy hereafter. We compare his findings to those of the 
representative agent deterministic version of his economy. Notice that the main 
statistics of the representative agent deterministic version of our model with habits 
are the same as those of the model without habits. Section 4.2 describes the 
properties of economies with habits, without any further adjustments. Sections 4.3 
and 4.4 show the results for economies with habits where we recalibrate our model 
economy so that, respectively, IES and total savings match those of the economy 
without habits. Section 4.5 looks at survival habits.
4.1. The benchmark model economy
The main characteristics of the benchmark model economy, that we refer to
sometimes as economy B; are described in Table 3.
The first column shows the values of the key statistics of the deterministic
representative agent counterpart of the benchmark economy.36 We denote this
33For s > 1 and 0ogo1:
34We have also tried larger samples. We see that sample sizes beyond our choice do not change
aggregate results. However, for histograms and for reporting the shares of certain groups we use a larger
sample size of 50000.
35For further details, see Ríos-Rull (1998).
36The deterministic model has been calibrated with the same parameters as those used in the benchmark
economy and setting the labor endowment equal to the unconditional mean of the earning process.
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economy as D: As we see the interest rate is 4.17% and the capital output ratio is
2.959. For comparison purposes, we have normalized output to one in this
deterministic economy. The second column includes the statistics of the benchmark
model economy. We also report two measures of wealth dispersion, the coefficient of
variation and the Gini Index. The last column reports the proportional variation in
the main statistics of the benchmark model economy with respect to the deterministic
economy. Note that both economies have different interest rates. This means that
agents are responding to different prices.37 We want to highlight two main things
from this table. First, precautionary savings, that we define as the excess in total
wealth that a given economy has over its deterministic counterpart, are small, less
than 2%, confirming Aiyagari’s findings. Second, under this parameterization, assets
holdings are very evenly distributed. The Gini coefficient, for example, is 0.40 while
is 0.78 in the U.S. data.
4.2. The unadjusted habits’ economies
As stated, we compare two habits economies with the benchmark model economy.
Except for the existence of habits, the two habits economies have the same
parameterization as the benchmark model economy. They differ from each other in
the persistence of the habits. The second column of Table 4 reports the main
statistics of what we refer as the non-persistent habit economy, or economy N ; while
the fourth column refers to the persistent habit economy, or economy P: The third
and fifth columns have the rates of change between the habits economies and the
benchmark model economies.38
Table 3
Main statistics of the benchmark economy and its deterministic counterpart
D B
Deterministic Benchmark Change
economy economy BD
D
100
Aggregate assets 2.959 3.015 1.9%
Output 1.000 1.007 0.7%
Capital output ratio 2.959 2.994 1.2%
Interest rate 4.17% 4.02% 3.5%
Coeff. of variation of wealth 0.0 0.748 —
Gini index of wealth 0.0 0.404 —
37In fact if in the benchmark model economy the interest rate were set exogenously at the level of the
deterministic economy, total assets w ill be unbounded. See Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), Ríos-Rull 
(1998).
38As in the previous Subsection, we are looking at the general equilibrium version of the economies
where the interest rates adjust to ensure that aggregate asset holdings equate aggregate capital. This means
that interest rates are different than in economy B: If we keep fixed the interest rate (without letting it clear
markets) we see what happens in absence of this price effect. Economy N has total assets of 2.87 and
economy P of 4.11, which clearly shows much larger changes than their general equilibrium counterparts.
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Regarding total assets, we see that both economies are quite similar to the non-
habits case. Aggregate savings are nearly unchanged, moving in opposite directions.
Whereas in the non-persistent case they fall by just a 0.09%, they increase by 0.67%
in the persistent case. Movements in output and capital-output ratio follow. Even in
the persistent economy, precautionary savings stay quite low, at 2.56%. However,
wealth dispersion changes more. With non-persistent habits, our measures of
dispersion fall by about 3 percent but they fall about 10 percent with persistent
habits.
Fig. 1 shows the Lorenz curves for assets of the three model economies. We see
how similar are the benchmark and the non-persistent unadjusted habit model
Table 4
Main statistics of the benchmark and the unadjusted habits economies
B N P
Benchmark Non-pers. Change Pers. Change
economy habits habits
l ¼ 1 NB
B
l ¼ 0:25 PB
B
Aggregate assets 3.015 3.012 0.1% 3.035 0.7%
Output 1.007 1.006 0.0% 1.009 0.2%
Capital output ratio 2.994 2.993 0.0% 3.007 0.4%
Interest rate 4.02% 4.03% 0.2% 3.97% 1.3%
Precautionary savings 1.9% 1.8% 4.6% 2.6% 34.4%
Coeff. of var. wealth 0.748 0.721 2.7% 0.669 10.6%
Gini index wealth 0.404 0.393 2.7% 0.367 9.2%
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Fig. 1. Lorenz curve for assets: unadjusted economies, s ¼ 2; b ¼ 0:96:
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economies while in the persistent unadjusted model economy the distribution is a
little bit more even. We report the histograms of asset holdings in Fig. 2. The
histogram shows quite similar pictures for all economies.
Overall, we see that for economies that differ only in the specification of habits
from the benchmark model economy, the implied differences for precautionary
savings are not very big. They fall slightly for the non-persistent economy and they
increase for the persistent economy. This is a pattern we find throughout all
experiments: precautionary savings are always larger for economies where habits are
persistent than for economies where habits are non-persistent. Inequality indicators
fall in both economies, more in the persistent case.
However, the differences we have seen between the benchmark economy and the
habits economies cannot be solely attributed to the effect of habits. In particular,
the benchmark model economy has an intertemporal IES ¼ 0:5 while that of the
unadjusted economies with habits have a value of IES ¼ 0:8: This means that
households in the unadjusted habits economies have a smaller desire to smooth
consumption intertemporally. In the next subsection we report the properties of
economies with habits, both persistent and non-persistent where the parameter s has
been adjusted to generate a IES ¼ 0:5; the value of the benchmark model economy.
4.3. Adjusting habits to match the IES
Habits break the link between the individual’s willingness to choose a contingent
consumption plan, measured by the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion and the
individual’s willingness to intertemporally substitute consumption, measured by the
-50
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Fig. 2. Histogram for assets: unadjusted economies s ¼ 2; b ¼ 0:96: General equilibrium.
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IES. Each measure is the inverse of the other in the representative agent version of
the benchmark economy, the economy without habits. This is no longer true in an
economy with habits. Thus, to investigate the effect of habits on the level of
precautionary savings we need to isolate the effect of habits on the level of risk
aversion from the effect on the IES. In this subsection we recalibrate our habits
economies so that the IES of the habits economies is the same as in the benchmark
economy.39
Recall that in economies with habits IES ¼ 1=ðgþ ð1 gÞsÞ; where g is calibrated
at 0.75 and IES targeted to 0.5. This implies that s has to be increased to 5: Notice
that this means that households in the unadjusted habits economies of the previous
section have substantially less desire for smoothing consumption over time than they
will in the economy where we adjust s: We have then two new model economies, an
economy with non-persistent habits adjusted so that its IES ¼ 0:5; that we denote
economy M; and an economy with persistent habits also adjusted to have its IES ¼
0:5; that we denote economy Q:
The results are reported in Table 5. Notice that precautionary savings increase
substantially in both economies with respect to the deterministic case. Now, they are
3.6% of total wealth in the deterministic case in the non-persistent habits economies
and more than 5.6% in the persistent habits economies. So precautionary savings are
between two and three times larger than in the benchmark model economy
depending on the persistence. So habits indeed increase precautionary savings over
the benchmark model economy, although perhaps their effect on aggregate capital is
small.
With respect to wealth dispersion, we see an overall reduction of the inequality
indicators, which is more evident in the economy with persistent habits where the
reduction in inequality is more dramatic. Fig. 4 reports the histograms of asset
holdings of the benchmark model economies and of the habits economies with
IES ¼ 0:5: Here we start seeing a much clearer picture than in the economies with a
Table 5
Main statistics of the benchmark and the adjusted habits economies IES ¼ 0:5
B M Q
Benchmark Non-pers. Change Pers. Change
economy habits habits
l ¼ 1 MB
B
l ¼ 0:25 QB
B
Aggregate assets 3.015 3.066 1.7% 3.126 3.7%
Output 1.007 1.013 0.6% 1.020 1.3%
Capital output ratio 2.994 3.027 1.1% 3.065 2.4%
Interest rate 4.02% 3.89% 3.2% 3.75% 6.9%
Precautionary savings 1.9% 3.6% 92.8% 5.7% 200.9%
Coeff. of var. wealth 0.748 0.676 9.6% 0.611 18.3%
Gini index wealth 0.404 0.371 8.2% 0.339 16.1%
39We are referring to the IES of the deterministic representative agent version of each model throughout
the paper.
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larger IES. Inequality clearly goes down, especially for persistent habits. The Lorenz
curves of the habits economies (see Figs. 3–4) are much closer to the diagonal than
those in the benchmark model economy and the histograms seem to be much tighter.
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Fig. 4. Histogram for assets: economies adjusted to the IES.
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It is also more evident that a big part of the distributional differences are due to poor
people: households in economies with habits, not wanting to face fluctuations on
consumption, make sure they do not hold too low asset levels. In any case, the
reduction of inequality as measured by the statistics that we have chosen is always
less than 20 percent.
4.4. Economies with the same savings as the benchmark model economy
To finish we want to isolate the effects of habits on inequality from those on
precautionary savings. To this end we perform a second adjustment on the habit
economies. We adjust the parameter b so that aggregate capital and hence the
equilibrium interest rate is equal to that of the benchmark model economy.
We label M 0 and Q0 the non-persistent and persistent economies respectively.
Results are in Table 6. As we can see the statistics for inequality are essentially
identical to those for the economies of the previous subsection with the same b as the
benchmark model economy. Fig. 5 shows the Lorenz curves for assets of the
benchmark model economy and of the habits economies adjusted to have the same
IES and the same precautionary savings as the benchmark economy, while Fig. 6
reports their histograms of asset holdings. Both the Lorenz curve and the histogram
resemble the ones already seen in the previous section, but with the value added for
the histogram that the means of the distribution for the three economies are set to be
equal. This allows us to see where the differences in wealth dispersion lie. We
basically see that, as already stated, the habit economies have much fewer people in
low levels of assets and more people about the mean, with hardly no differences in
the high values. Again, this effect is stronger for persistent habits.
4.5. An economy with survival habits
We next explore the behavior of an economy with survival habits. The temporary
utility function with survival habits can be written as uðct; htÞ ¼ ððct  ghtÞ
1s  1Þ=
ð1 sÞ while its law of motion for the habit stock is given by Eq. (6). We set
parameters as in economies N and P except for parameter g: We solve the economies
Table 6
Main statistics of the benchmark and the habits economies adjusted to have IES ¼ 0:5 and identical
precautionary savings
B M 0 Q0
Benchmark Non-pers. Change Pers. Change
economy habits habits
l ¼ 1 MB
B
l ¼ 0:25 QB
B
b 0.960 0.959 0.1% 0.957 0.3%
Coeff. of var. wealth 0.748 0.678 9.4% 0.616 17.6%
Gini index wealth 0.404 0.372 7.9% 0.341 15.6%
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for g ¼ 0:1; a very low value. The reason is that habits affect very differently the
different groups of agents. While it barely affects those agents with high
consumption and high habits, it affects a lot agents with low habits and low
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consumption. This, which is not a problem in representative agent economies where
there is very little variation in consumption, produces a very unstable computational
problem. The problem is computationally particularly acute. We have to solve for
many combinations of habits and wealth. Unfortunately many of those combina-
tions prove lethal for the consumer (too much habit and to little wealth) producing
negative values for c  gh: It is difficult to rule out ex ante those combinations that
consumers would try very hard to avoid. Addressing this issue properly will require
some innovative computational procedures that dynamically determine which subset
of pairs of assets and habits is relevant.
Table 7 shows the value of the main statistics for the model economy that we have
been exploring. As we can see they are very similar to those of the benchmark model
economy, indicating that the role of habits in these economies is very small.
Precautionary savings are 1.9% and 2.0% respectively whereas Gini indices are 0.402
and 0.399. Notice therefore the small increase in precautionary savings (even for the
non-persistent case there is a tiny increase hidden by the rounding) and the fall in the
inequality measures. Lemma 2 establishes that in these economies with survival
habits the IES is given by 1=s:
4.6. Final comments
We have seen two things: first, in habits economies precautionary savings are
substantially higher and the level of wealth inequality is a little lower than in their
non-habits counterparts and, second, these effects are stronger in economies with
persistent habits. We comment each result in detail.
Households in habits economies are more displeased with fluctuations in
consumption than their counterparts in economies without habits. Households with
habits want not only a stable pattern of consumption but also a stable pattern of
variations in consumption. Consequently, households in habits economies hold more
assets. We see this in both the size of precautionary savings and in the shape of the
lower tail of the distribution. Regarding the size of precautionary savings, we have
seen that once adjusting s to keep IES unchanged, total precautionary savings
doubles or triples depending on persistence, admittedly from quite a low value
Table 7
Main statistics of the benchmark and the survival habits economy g ¼ 0:10
Benchmark Non-pers. Pers.
economy habits habits
l ¼ 1 l ¼ 0:25
Aggregate assets 3.015 3.015 3.017
Output 1.007 1.007 1.007
Capital output ratio 2.994 2.995 2.996
Interest rate 4.02% 4.02% 4.016
Precautionary savings 1.90% 1.91% 1.97%
Coeff. of var. wealth 0.748 0.745 0.739
Gini index wealth 0.404 0.402 0.399
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(1.9%). Regarding the shape of the lower tail, we observe that it is asset-poor
households who increase more their asset holdings.40 The reason for this is twofold.
On the one hand, the share of uncertain labor earnings in their total income is higher
for asset-poor households than for asset-rich households. On the other hand, asset-
poor households are not well self-insured, which means that income fluctuations
get easily translated into consumption fluctuations. On the contrary, asset-rich
households have a stock of assets large enough to buffer fluctuations. So it is for the
former households that an increase on the loss of utility due to consumption
fluctuations is more likely to change savings behavior. This asymmetric impact of
habits on asset-poor and asset-rich households accounts for the reduction in
inequality.
Both effects on precautionary savings and on inequality are stronger for persistent
habits. In Appendix C we show that along a balanced growth path, a measure of risk
aversion in consumption (proposed by Boldrin et al. (1997)) is greater the higher the
persistence in habits. (It also shows that risk aversion is higher than in economies
without habits). This is because with persistent habits, a fall in consumption today
has a small impact in lowering the habit stock for tomorrow. In contrast, the
opposite is true when habits are non-persistent: a fall in consumption today is easily
translated in a fall in the habit stock for tomorrow. Since not only the consumption
level but also consumption relative to the habit stock matters, the fall in
consumption is worse in utility terms if the habit stock stays stuck at its previous
level than if it falls together with consumption. In a sense, non-persistent habits act
as a safety net: being poor is not so bad because one gets easily used to it.
As we have stated, the overall effect on aggregate capital is not big. This is because
the largest changes in savings behavior are done by asset-poor people, whose share
of total assets is very small.
We turn next to explore whether these findings are specific to our parameterization
or also hold for a larger set of model economies.
5. Economies with high earnings variability
One of the problems that Aiyagari’s economy has in trying to match the U.S.
wealth distribution is that the earnings distribution itself, an exogenous element, is
already lacking dispersion. In his benchmark economy, he sets the coefficient of
variation for the earnings distribution to be equal to 0.2, which in our experiments
gives a Gini index of 0.11. The values of the Coefficient of variation and the Gini
index for the U.S. economy are respectively 4.19 and 0.63.41 One interesting
robustness analysis is, hence, to see how the conclusions change if we allow for an
40Quantitatively, the bottom 5% of the assets distribution have an average stock of assets of 0.13 (0.2%
share) in the benchmark economy whereas they have 0.27 (0.4%) and 0.31 (0.5%) in the economies
labelled M 0 and Q0: On the other side, for the top 5% the average assets are 9.00 (15.0%) for the
benchmark and 8.11 (13.5%) and 7.56 (12.6%) for the economies M 0 and Q0:
41See Díaz-Gimenez et al. (1997).
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income process generating much more earnings inequality to a level similar to the 
U.S. data. Castañeda et al. (2001) calibrate the earnings process (among other 
features of their model economy) so that a suitably modified version of Aiyagari’s 
model accounts for the Lorenz curve of wealth observed in the U.S. We construct a 3 
point Markov process that has some of the properties of the 4 point Markov process 
of Castañeda et al. (2001)42 that we report in Table 8. To get a high Gini coefficient 
w ith just three points in the Markov chain, one needs to make each state very 
different, in the process that we construct the endowment of the lucky households is 
almost 50 times the endowment of the unlucky ones. This process for earnings has a 
Gini index of 0.60.43
We run the same experiments that we run for the low earnings volatility process
with this new earnings process, following the same calibration procedures. The only
difference lies in the parameter b because we want the benchmark economy to have
the same aggregate capital and interest rate as the benchmark economy with
Aiyagari’s earnings process. To do so, b must be lowered from 0.96 to 0.887. Higher
variability calls for more precautionary savings.
What we find is that qualitative results remain unchanged. In the first panel of
Table 9 we can see the no habits economy B against what we called economies M
and Q: those with non-persistent and persistent habits respectively with s adjusted
to have the same IES as in the no-habits economy. In the no-habits economy
precautionary savings are 134.3%, a huge number compared to the 1.9% with
Aiyagari’s earnings process. This is the consequence of having such a big variability
in earnings. Remember that in Aiyagari’s earnings process the endowment in good
time is less than 50% higher than the endowment in bad times, whereas in the high
earnings variability process, the endowment in good times is about 50 times larger
than in bad times. As before, the habits economies exhibit higher precautionary
savings, being the increase larger for the economy Q with persistent habits. In the
non-persistent habits economy, precautionary savings are 50% larger while in the
persistent habits economy, they are more than 150% larger. This time the increase is
Table 8
Earnings process of the high earnings variability economies
eAe1; e2; e3 ¼ 1:00; 5.29, 46:55
pe;e0 ¼
0:992
0:009
0:000
2
4 0:0080:980
0:083
0:000
0:011
0:917
3
5
p% ¼ 0.481 0.456 0.063
42There are many ways of implementing this reduction. Our choice should be seen as merely illustrative
for the study of the properties that habit formation has on Economies with high Earnings variability.
43The process estimated by Castañeda et al. (2001) includes retires and it was designed for a model where 
households choose work effort. The process here is just intended to be in the ball park of that one. For 
instance, notice that even though the Gini Index is close to that in the data, its coefficient of variation is 
smaller than one-half that in the data.
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over an already very large number,44 making the role of habits very important in
shaping this variable.
The model economies display a much higher coefficient of variation and Gini 
indices than the economies with Aiyagari’s earnings process. Moreover, the values of 
the Gini index are even larger than the 0.78 of U.S. data.45 This very high 
concentration of wealth can be seen both by means of the Lorenz curves plotted in 
Fig. 7, that are much closer to the bottom right corner than the earlier ones, and by 
means of the shares of w ealth held by selected groups of households reported in 
Table 10 where we can see that the share of wealth of the bottom 40% is zero and 
that of the top 10% is about 77%.
But what we really care about is the contribution of habits to shape inequality. We
see that all our measures of inequality fall somewhat in the habits economies versus
the no-habits economy, again more sharply for the economy with persistent habits.
The main change in all economies occurs by having an increase in the share of the
third and fourth quintiles at the expense of the fifth, especially of the households in
Table 9
Main statistics of the high earnings variability economies
Habits economies adjusted to have IES ¼ 0:5
B M Q
Non-pers. Change Pers. Change
No habits habits habits
l ¼ 1 NB
B
l ¼ 0:25 PB
B
Aggregate assets 3.015 3.848 27.7% 5.948 97.3%
Output 1.007 1.099 9.2% 1.285 27.7%
Capital output ratio 2.994 3.501 16.9% 4.626 54.5%
Interest rate 4.02% 2.28% 43.2% 0.22% 105.4%
Precautionary savings 134.3% 199.1% 48.2% 362.3% 169.8%
Coeff. of var. wealth 2.491 2.405 3.4% 2.274 8.7%
Gini index wealth 0.857 0.831 3.0% 0.805 6.1%
Habits economies adjusted to have IES ¼ 0:5 and identical precautionary savings.
B M
0
Q
0
Precautionary savings 134.3% 201.6% 50.2% 455.3% 239.1%
b 0.887 0.859 3.1% 0.781 11.9%
Coeff. of var. wealth 2.491 2.459 1.3% 2.486 0.2%
Gini index wealth 0.857 0.838 2.2% 0.830 3.2%
44Recall that these economies are parameterized so that the no-habits economy, B; has the same wealth
as the benchmark model economy, B; and for this the discount rates have been reduced quite dramatically.
45As shown in Castañeda et al. (2001) this type of process accounts for wealth inequality in an economy 
w ith a lot more detail built in. The actual number of the version that w e use in this paper is not so 
important. Here, we are not after accounting for wealth inequality, but we are trying to measure the role of 
habit formation in changing our answers about wealth inequality and precautionary savings.
25
the 80–95 percentiles. The fall of inequality in economies w ith habits adjusted to 
have the same precautionary savings is almost zero. How ever, the distribution of 
wealth has changed as it can be seen in Table 10, even if the total contribution of these 
changes to the coefficient of variation and the Gini Index is minimal.
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Fig. 7. Lorenz curve for assets: high earnings variability economies.
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To sum up, we just want to point out that the conclusions under this more volatile
earnings process strengthen those obtained with the less volatile Aiyagari’s process.
We find that precautionary savings (and aggregate capital) increase dramatically
whereas our measures of inequality fall slightly, these effects being stronger for
persistent habits. Also as before, we see that it is asset-poor households who
proportionally raise more their asset holdings.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the role of habits in shaping the distribution of 
wealth. Our findings indicate that once we properly calibrate the economy to match 
the IES, the introduction of habits increases precautionary savings up to three times 
the (low) level of the benchmark model economy calibrated as in Aiyagari (1994). Its 
role in shaping inequality is that it reduces it: the inequality statistics go down in 
some cases 18%. These differences w ith the benchmark economy are more 
pronounced when habits are persistent than when they are not. When we calibrate 
our economies using an earnings process that better matches the observed earnings 
inequality in the U.S. w e find the same qualitative results. Precautionary savings 
increase substantially from an already very large value and inequality indicators 
decrease a bit, with changes being bigger for persistent habits economies.
Habits affect the way households dislike consumption fluctuations. In this class of
incomplete markets economies, where households are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks, income fluctuations are only partially insurable through the accumulation of
assets. Households with a long stream of good shocks hold big amounts of assets and
reach a satisfactory degree of insurance. Households with a long stream of bad
shocks are left with few assets and therefore have to bear consumption fluctuations.
Not surprisingly, the comparison between an economy with habit formation and an
economy without habit formation shows that it is asset-poor people behavior that
differs the most. Since the presence of habits makes consumption fluctuations more
painful, those households with a small level of self-insurance will try to increase it by
holding higher asset stocks. This makes the wealth distribution more even by
reducing the number of people holding very low levels of assets.
Table 10
The distributions of wealth in the high earnings variability economies
Quintiles Top groups (%)
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
B (no habits) 0.00 0.00 1.51 3.60 94.89 76.62 50.62 13.65
M (IES-adj. non-pers) 0.04 0.04 3.52 5.35 91.04 74.75 49.47 12.91
Q (IES-adj. pers) 0.01 0.02 5.23 7.85 86.89 71.21 47.21 12.05
M 0 (same sav non-per) 0.01 0.01 3.35 5.04 91.60 76.54 50.89 12.89
Q0 (same sav per) 0.00 0.00 4.28 6.39 89.32 77.23 52.43 12.59
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Appendix A. Computational procedures
To solve the consumer’s problem described in Section 2.4 we follow a successive
approximations approach in the value function. Our individual state space contains
two endogenous individual variables (assets and habits) as well as the exogenous
idiosyncratic shock. This implies the need to create a two-dimensional grid for the
endogenous state and interpolate for solutions of assets and habits tomorrow
different from the grid points. We will do this interpolation by two-dimensional
splines. To our knowledge, there is no attempt done to solve a problem of this class
through bidimensional splines. We explain below how we implement it. To solve for
the steady state we proceed as follows. First, given a pair of prices fw; rg we solve the
household problem. Second, we compute the aggregate capital implied by this
solution. This aggregate capital may or may not be consistent with the given prices
fw; rg: If it is, they are the steady state prices. If it is not, we get a new pair fw0; r0g
and repeat the process. Below we describe the procedure in more detail
A.1. Solving the household’s problem
The Contraction Mapping Theorem tells us that following a successive
approximations strategy in the functional equation (1) will guarantee finding its
fixed point. Moreover, any initial guess will do as long as it is concave in its
endogenous arguments. More precisely, deriving the FOC we get the following
system:
0 ¼  ucðc; hÞ þ b
X
e0
pe;e0 ½vaðe0; a0;cðc; hÞÞ  vhðe0; a0;cðc; hÞÞccðc; hÞ; ðA:1Þ
c ¼ ew þ ð1þ rÞa  a0 ðA:2Þ
which defines implicitly the policy functions a0 ¼ gaðe; a; hÞ and c ¼ gcðe; a; hÞ ¼
ew þ ð1þ rÞa  gaðe; a; hÞ: We substitute them back into Eq. (1) to get
vðe; a; hÞ ¼ u½gcðe; a; hÞ; h þ b
X
e0
pe;e0vfe0; gaðe; a; hÞ;c½gcðe; a; hÞ; hg: ðA:3Þ
First, we choose a family of functions that the computer can understand. The
problem we face here is one of two endogenous choice state variables. This means
that we will need to compute the value function at any point in a bidimensional
continuous support as well as at each point of the Markov process. We choose a
bispline interpolation over a grid on a and h: Splines are very useful in this context
because they guarantee continuous first and second derivatives. We need first
derivatives to write the FOC and second derivatives to use Newton-based non-linear
equation solvers.46 Then, we guess an initial value function v0; solve numerically the
46We construct the bispline approximation by use of a tensor product of two unidimensional splines. An
explanation on howto compute tensor products over two spaces of interpolating functions can be found in 
De Boor (1978), chapter XVII. In particular we use the algorithm implemented in the IMSL subroutine 
DBSINT.
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FOC 7 and 8 at each point ðei; aj ; hkÞ of the three-dimensional grid for the state space,
get the policy functions g0;aðei; aj ; hkÞ and g0;cðei; aj ; hkÞ; use the bispline interpolation
to substitute them back into the functional equation (9) and get an updated v1: If v1
and v0 are close enough we reached the fixed point. If they are not we iterate on,
using v1 instead of v0 to get certain v2:
There are two possible problems associated with the approach just described. The
first one is that the Contraction Mapping Theorem does not necessarily hold once we
restrict the space of continuous and bounded functions to which v belongs to a some
computer storable subspace. The second one is that the bispline approximation does
not necessarily preserve concavity. Whereas we have not found any difficulty
associated with the former problem, the latter deserves further comments. A spline is
basically an interpolation mechanism that uses a third order polynomial in each
interval between grid points. When a piece-wise linear approach is followed, what
happens to a function to be approximated in one interval is totally independent of
what happens to it in another one. However, this is not completely true for splines,
since the requirement that first and second derivatives from the left and from the
right at each grid point equal each other makes the polynomials in each interval not
independent. A utility function is an object with sharp changes of slope, being first
and second derivatives huge at low levels of c and h and much smaller at higher
levels. This properties translate into the value function. Using few grid points means
that, not only the approximation is worse than using many but also that certain
properties of the function may be lost. Precisely, we observed that using a 15 15
grid47 would lead, in the more extreme parameterizations,48 to a loss of concavity
and, even worse, monotonicity. The reason of this is that the high first derivative
of utility at low levels of c is translated into the adjacent intervals so that the
splines approximation overshoots the function to be approximated. Only slowly
the slope of the spline can go down and recover, creating a hump. To solve this,
one needs to use many grid points close to zero, the area where this happens, to
make sure the spline slope can fall gradually. We increased the grid to 75 20
points. Notice that this means solving the household’s problem for 4500 points at
each iteration
A.2. Solving for the steady state
Here we follow a standard procedure. We choose an initial guess r1 and solve the
household problem to get ga
r1
ðe; a; hÞ and gc
r1
ðe; a; hÞ: Then, we guess an initial sample
of individuals of size 5000 and apply to them ga
r1
ðe; a; hÞ; gc
r1
ðe; a; hÞ and the law of
motion for the Markov process 3000 times, which ensures in all experiments we have
done that the main statistics of the sample are almost constant. This gives us the
47More dense close to the zeros than close to the upper bounds.
48More extreme parameterizations mean high s; high g and high variability of the earnings process. All
these three characteristics create higher differences in the marginal utility of consumption across grid
points. The problems would first arise at those points with low consumption and high habits because the
lower the consumption and the higher the habit, the higher the marginal utility of consumption.
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aggregate assets in the economy Ar1 : Then, we find r
2 such that the demand of capital
by firms, KðrÞ equals Ar1 : Say r
1or2 (if not, relabel). Since capital demand is
decreasing in r and aggregate assets are increasing in r; the steady state interest rate
r belongs to the interval ðr1; r2Þ: From this point we start the iterative procedure. We
take the middle point in the interval, call it r3; and get the associated Ar3 : If
Ar3oKðr3Þ the interest rate we have tried is too small, so we set r1 ¼ r3 and start
again. If Ar3 > Kðr
3Þ the interest rate we have tried is too big, so we set r2 ¼ r3 and
start again. We stop when the distance between r1 and r2 is arbitrarily small. To
ensure no sampling error is spoiling the convergence to r we use the same seed to
initialize the random number generator in each iteration.
Some of our model economies (case of M and Q) are set to have the same interest
rate and aggregate capital as a given one ðBÞ by adjusting the time preference
parameter b: The procedure used to get the steady state in these cases differs from the
one just described in that r is fixed and in that we have to iterate in different values of
b: The initialization of the procedure is not so clean because it is not possible to
compute an interval ðb1;b2Þ where our b belongs to. We proceed as follows. We
guess an initial b1: If Ab1 oK we know we have a lower bound. If Ab1 > K we
know we have an upper bound. In the former (respectively latter) case we try higher
(lower) betas until we find a b2 for which Ab2 > K
 ðAb2oKÞ: Then, since capital
demand is invariant in beta and aggregate assets are increasing, we know that
bAðb1;b2Þ: From this point we can apply to b instead to r the iterative procedure
described in the previous paragraph.
Appendix B. IES
To correctly compare the habits economies with the non-habits economy we want 
to make them equal in certain dimensions. One of these dimensions is the IES. The 
follow ing result gives the explicit form for the IES in the economies with 
proportional habits (Carroll et al. (2000)). In general the IES is not constant for 
different consumption and habit values. How ever, it can be nicely characterized 
along a balanced grow th consumption path. Notice in addition that the IES is 
independent of the persistence of the habit stock.
Lemma B.1. For the certainty case with multiplicative habit, the IES in the steady
state is independent of l and equal to 1=ðgþ ð1 gÞsÞ:
Proof. Recall that the instantaneous utility function is uðc; hÞ ¼ ððchgÞ1s  1Þ=
ð1 sÞ; with 1 > g > 0: The Euler equation is
cst h
gðs1Þ
t  bgl
XN
i¼1
½bð1 lÞi1xtþi
¼ bð1þ rÞ cstþ1h
gðs1Þ
tþ1  bgl
XN
i¼1
½bð1 lÞi1xtþ1þi
( )
; ðB:1Þ
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where xt ¼ c1st h
gðs1Þ1
t : Then, we can write the stock of habit as a function of all
past consumption:
htþ1 ¼ ð1 lÞht þ lct ¼ l
XN
i¼0
ð1 lÞicti: ðB:2Þ
A balanced growth path requires that ct ¼ Ztc which implies that the habit stock
is ht ¼ AZtc; with A ¼ l=ðZ ð1 lÞÞ; which means that consumption and
habit stock grow at the same rate. Also along a balanced growth path, xt ¼
Agðs1Þ1c
½gþð1gÞs
t :
Substituting in the Euler equation ht and xt by their balanced growth path values
we obtain:
Ac½gþð1gÞs  bglBZ½gþð1gÞsc½gþð1gÞs
¼ bð1þ rÞfAZ½gþð1gÞsc½gþð1gÞs  bglBZ2½gþð1gÞsc½gþð1gÞsg; ðB:3Þ
where
B 	
XN
i¼0
½bð1 lÞi½Z½gþð1gÞsi ¼
1
1 bð1 lÞZ½gþð1gÞs
:
Using Z½gþð1gÞs as common factor in the right hand side dramatically simplifies this
expression until we get 1 ¼ bð1þ rÞZ½gþð1gÞs from where the IES can be directly
evaluated yielding the value of 1=ðgþ ð1 gÞsÞ: &
Under certain conditions, for habit preferences with survival consumption, the
IES also has a simple expression.
Lemma B.2. The IES of habit preferences with survival consumption along a balanced
growth consumption path is independent of g; and l and is equal to 1=s:
Proof. Recall that the instantaneous utility function is uðc; hÞ ¼ ððc  ghÞ1s 
1Þ=ð1 sÞ; with 1 > g > 0: Its Euler equation is
ðct  ghtÞ
s  bgl
XN
i¼1
½bð1 lÞi1ðctþi  ghtþiÞ
s
¼ bð1þ rÞ ðctþ1  ghtþ1Þ
s  bgl
XN
i¼1
½bð1 lÞi1ðctþ1þi  ghtþ1þiÞ
s
( )
:
ðB:4Þ
Again, the stock of habit is given by htþ1 ¼ ð1 lÞht þ lct ¼ l
PN
i¼0 ð1 lÞ
icti:
Along a balanced growth path we have ct ¼ Ztc: which implies that the habit stock
is ht ¼ AZtc; with A ¼ l=ðZ ð1 lÞÞ; which means that consumption and habit
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stock grow at the same rate. Replacing the stock of habits in the Euler equation
along a balanced growth path yields
csð1 gAÞs  bglð1 gAÞsBZscs
¼ bð1þ rÞfZscsð1 gAÞs  bglð1 gAÞsBZ2scsg; ðB:5Þ
where
B 	
XN
i¼0
½bð1 lÞZsi ¼
1
1 bð1 lÞZs
:
Using Zs as common factor in the right hand side dramatically simplifies this
expression until we get 1 ¼ bð1þ rÞZs from where the IES can be directly evaluated
yielding the value of 1=s: &
Appendix C. Risk aversion
We proceed as Ferson and Constantinides (1991). Consider the following
problem,
vðat; htÞ ¼ Max
XN
i¼0
bi1
ðctþih
g
tþiÞ
1s
1 s
ðC:1Þ
s:t:
XN
i¼0
1
1þ r
 i
ctþi ¼ at; ðC:2Þ
htþi ¼ ð1 lÞhtþi1 þ lctþi1: ðC:3Þ
The solution for this problem is a policy function ctþiðat; htÞ; that specifies
consumption at each period t þ i: We define
Ut ¼
XN
i¼0
bi1
ðctþih
g
tþiÞ
1s
1 s
; ðC:4Þ
that is, utility for a given stream of consumption starting at period t: Notice that
Ut ¼ uðct; htÞ þ bUtþ1; where uðct; htÞ denotes instantaneous utility.
We follow Boldrin et al. (1997) and define an enhanced measure of risk aversion in 
consumption as
RRAc ¼ 
@2uðct;htÞ
@c2t
þ b @
2vðatþ1;htþ1Þ
@h2
tþ1
@htþ1
@ct
 2
@uðct;htÞ
@ct
þ b @vðatþ1;htþ1Þ@htþ1
@htþ1
@ct
ct: ðC:5Þ
This measure adds to the Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion (which is just the
first term) another term that tracks the effect that is propagated towards the future.
In words, this measure takes into account that a change in current consumption,
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holding constant the value of next period wealth induces a change in the optimal
path of consumption due to the change in habits. Let us call ctþiðatþ1; htþ1Þ the level
of consumption from period t þ 1 onwards associated to the initial wealth atþ1 and
stock of habits htþ1: Then, define dvðat; htÞ=dct; the derivative of the value function
assuming that atþ1 does not change with ct;
dvðat; htÞ
dct
¼
@Ut
@ct
þ
XN
i¼1
bi
@Utþi
@ctþi
@ctþi
@htþ1
l
¼
@Ut
@ct
1þ
@Utþ1=@ctþ1
@Ut=@ct
b
XN
i¼1
bi1
@Utþi=@ctþi
@Utþ1=@ctþ1
dctþi
dhtþ1
l
" #
: ðC:6Þ
The Euler equation tells us that @Ut=@ct ¼ bð1þ rÞ@Utþ1=@ctþ1; therefore,
dvðat; htÞ
dct
¼
@Ut
@ct
1þ
1
1þ r
XN
i¼1
1
1þ r
 i1
dctþi
dhtþ1
l
" #
: ðC:7Þ
Differentiating the intertemporal budget constraint that starts at t þ 1; we
obtain that
XN
i¼1
1
1þ r
 i1
dctþi
dhtþ1
l ¼ 0:
And therefore, dvðat; htÞ=dct ¼ @Ut=@ct: Thus,
RRAc ¼ 
@2Ut=@c2t
@Ut=@ct
ct 
XN
i¼1
@2Ut=@ctþi@ct
@Ut=@ct
dctþi
dhtþ1
lct
¼ 
@2Ut=@c2t
@Ut=@ct
ct 
XN
i¼1
@2Ut=@ctþi@ct
@Ut=@ct
dctþi
dhtþ1
ðhtþ1  ht þ lhtÞ: ðC:8Þ
In a stationary allocation, htþ1  ht ¼ 0 and dctþi=dhtþ1lhtElðdctþi=dhtþ1Þhtþ1: This
is a first order approximation to the true policy function, ðdctþi=dhtþ1Þhtþ1Ectþi;
RRAcE
@2Ut=@c2t
@Ut=@ct
ct  l
XN
i¼1
@2Ut=@ctþi@ct
@Ut=@ct
ctþi: ðC:9Þ
Hence in a stationary allocation,
RRAcE
s ½gð1 sÞ þ 1 gl
2b
½1bð1lÞ2
1 glb
1bð1lÞ
þ l
glb
1bð1lÞ
1 glb
1bð1lÞ
ð1 sÞ 
lð1 lÞb½gð1 sÞ þ 1
½1 bð1 lÞ2
 
: ðC:10Þ
For the chosen calibration, the enhanced measure of risk aversion in consumption is
larger in the persistent habits economies than in the non-persistent counterparts. In
both cases, risk aversion is larger than in the non-habits economies.
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